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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 920860-CA 
LINDA LEE HIXON, ) 
) Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Possession With Intent to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a) (Supp. 1991). This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the warrant affidavit was 
sufficient to establish piobable cause under the state and federal constitutions. 
2. Whether the Leon "good faith" exception applies in this case where the 
warrant affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
unreasonable and where the magistrate acted as a rubber stamp. 
3. Whether the Leon "good faith" exception applies under the Article I, Section 
14, of the Utah Constitution. 
4. Whether this Court should independently interpret Article I, Section 14, from 
the interpretation given the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
This Court leviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for 
clear error. However, the ultimate conclusion of the district court on whether a search is 
sound under the state or federal constitutions, a legal conclusion, is reviewed for correction 
of error. In a search wanant case, this Court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrates factual findings on probable cause. Rather, this Court looks at whether the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the facts presented supported 
probable cause. See State v. Strickling, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 69 (Ct. App. 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The constitutional piovisions, statutes and rules relevant to a determination of this 
case are: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unieasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons oi things to be seized. 
. i . 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Utah Constitution. Article 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant appellant, Linda Lee Hixon ("Hixon"), was charged by Information 
on September 4, 1991, with eight counts of controlled substance violation (R.7). 
Thereafter, on September 23, 1992, Hixon filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from 
her as a result of the search warrant executed on her residence (R.56). The motion was 
eventually denied March 9, 1992 (R.143). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hixon entered a conditional plea of guilty to one 
count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, a second degree felony. 
In return for the plea, the State moved to dismiss the seven other counts. Entry of Plea 
- 3 -
Transcript, 5/19/92, at 2-3 (Attachment B in the Record; Addendum A in this Brief). See 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
On December 9, 1992, the court sentenced Hixon to a prison term of one to fifteen 
years. The sentence, however, was suspended in lieu of a ninety-day term in the Grand 
County Jail (R.323). Finding good cause, the court then issued a certificate of probable 
cause and an order setting bond on appeal (R.346 and Addendum D). 
Subsequently, on December 18, 1992, Hixon filed a notice of appeal with the court 
below (R.326). There aie no prior or related appeals in this matter. 
STATKMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 4, 1991, Officer Joe Christman of the Utah Department of Public Safety 
("the affiant") requested a warrant to search the Hixon residence located at 153 East 300 
North in Moab, I'tah.1 I he affiant stated that he was contacted in November 1990 by Ron 
Richmond of the I oui Coineis Naicotics Strike force. Richmond told the affiant that Mr. 
Hixon had puichased one gallon of hydriodic acid from Intertech Chemicals in Orem, Utah 
(Aff. 3). The affiant stated that hydriodic acid is an essential element in illicit manufacture 
of methamphetamine (Aff. 3). Richmond also allegedly told the affiant that in November 
1990, a confidential informant purchased methamphetamine from two suspects, and the 
1
 The facts are found in the Affidavit for Search Warrant ("Aff."), attached hereto as 
Addendum "B." 
. 4 . 
suspects stated that the drugs were supplied by Hixon. On January 7, 1991, an arrestee 
also told Richmond that Hixon had provided her with methamphetamine "in the past." 
(Aff. 4). 
Thereafter, Richmond told the affiant that since February 1991, he had surveilled 
the Hixon residence and had observed people go in and out of the residence. Three days 
prior to executing the wan ant, Richmond and the affiant continued this surveillance and 
observed "the same traffic pattern" of people visiting for a short period of time (Aff. 5). 
Based on the foregoing, the affiant requested a no-knock search warrant for fear of safety 
of officers and because evidence could be easily destroyed (Aff. 7). 
The search uncovered diugs, paraphernalia, and United States currency. Thereafter, 
on January 21, 1992, Hixon filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The motion was 
eventually denied Maich 9, 1992 (R.143).2 
Pursuant to a plea agicement, the State moved to dismiss the other counts, while 
Hixon conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 
a second degiee felony. Entry of Plea Transcript, 5/19/92, at 2-3. See State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
On December 9, 1992, the court sentenced Hixon to a prison term of one to fifteen 
years. The sentence, however, was suspended in lieu of a ninety-day term in the Grand 
2
 R.143 is Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached hereto this Brief as 
Addendum C. 
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County Jail (R.323). Finding good cause, the court then issued a certificate of probable 
cause and an order setting bond on appeal (R.346). 
Subsequently, on December 18, 1992, Hixon filed a notice of appeal with the district 
court (R.326). There aie no prior or related appeals in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit underlying the search warrant executed on Hixon's residence lacked 
"probable cause" and does not pass constitutional muster even under the Leon "good faith" 
exception followed by federal courts. Further, the Leon "good faith" exception has no 
application under the Utah Constitution, which should be interpreted independent of the 
United States Constitution. Thus, this Court should reverse the decision of the district 
court and conclude that the search of Hixon's residence was in violation of her rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 14, 
of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for 
clear error. However, the ultimate legal conclusions based on the underlying facts are 
reviewed de novo, for correction of error. See State v. Strickling. 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 
69 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Lope/. 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
- 6-
POINT 1 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that all search warrants be based upon 
"probable cause suppoited by oath or affirmation.M U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const. 
art. I, § 14. The affidavit in the instant case contained three paragraphs which the State 
contends furnished piobable cause for the search warrant. Hixon will address each point 
separately. 
A. Information Had By the Affiant Was Insufficient 
Richmond alleged that Larry Hixon purchased one gallon of hydriodic acid from 
Intertech Chemicals in Orem, Utah (Aff. 3). The affiant further stated that hydriodic acid 
is an essential element in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine (Aff. 3). 
Probable cause has been defined as "a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). Accoid, State v. Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (Ct. App. 1993). 
In Miller, the defendant aigued that the following facts observed by the affiant were 
innocuous, consistent with innocent activity, and did not rise to the level of probable cause: 
complaints by neighbors of unusually heavy traffic; two swamp coolers that blow into a 
boarded up basement area at the defendant's residence; series of lights commonly used as 
- 7 -
grow lights; loading U-IIaul truck at odd hours at late night; presence of two large dogs; 
unusually heavy consumption of electricity; and the defendant had prior charges for illegal 
possession of drugs. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and she 
was convicted. This Couit affirmed the holding of the court below that the defendant 
"offered no evidence whatsoever as to what that equally consistent lawful conduct would 
be." id at 1366. 
Miller is cleatly distinguishable from the instant case. The only facts presented by 
the affiant was that he had icceived information that Larry Hixon had purchased hydriodic 
acid some time in November, 1990, and that hydriodic acid is used in manufacturing 
methamphetamine. He gave no detailed observation of other conduct that is peculiar to 
the criminally minded/ A case that is analytically more relevant is United States v. Tate, 
694 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984). 
In Tate, the affiant averred that an anonymous caller informed him that he could 
smell "a very strong odor such as ether coming from [the defendants'] residence and the 
premises," and that the caller was familiar with the odor of ether because he had himself 
* This case is also distinguishable from Rosenbaurn, where the affidavit "sets out 
clearly that the affiant initiated two controlled buys using two different C.I.s. The test 
results on the purchased substance indicated it was cocaine. Within one week prior to 
issuance of the wanant, a controlled drug buy had been completed. . . . " Rosenbaum, 204 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. Cf. ajso State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(C.I. helped officer in controlled buy and stated he had observed illicit drugs in defendant's 
residence). No such information was provided in the instant case, however. 
- 8 -
used it "on numerous occasions for the purpose of starting engines." Id. at 1219. The 
affiant also stated that he had gone to the said residence and had smelled a very strong 
odor of ether and believed that the defendants were manufacturing PCP. A search warrant 
was issued for the defendants' residence, and they were convicted of possession with intent 
to distribute PCP. 
In reversing their convictions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the defendants that: 
the smell of a noncontraband substance having a number of legitimate uses, 
standing alone does not establish probable cause to search a residence. . . . 
Ether has many innocuous uses. It is a very common solvent, and it is also 
used to start engines. 
* * * 
Because ether has several legitimate uses, its odor is not sufficiently 
distinctive to identify the manufacturing of PCP. 
Tate, 694 F.2d at 1221; see also United States v. Stanert 762 F.2d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(fact that defendant's residence emitted fumes and odor of ether insufficient for probable 
cause to search). 
In the instant case, the affiant's statement that Larry Hixon had purchased hydriodic 
acid is an innocuous fact which is consistent with innocent activity as well as criminal 
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activity and, therefore, insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant to search the 
Hixon residence.4 
B. The Informant's Basic Knowledge Was Never Established 
1. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
Under the Fouith Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question 
whether an "informant based" affidavit satisfies the probable cause standard is determined 
by the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); State v. 
Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (Ct. App. 1993).5 Some of the factors considered 
in the totality test include "the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential 
4
 Wiiting in the analogous context of probable cause for warrantless search and arrest, 
Professor LaFave concludes: 
It is commonly said that "an arrest and search based on events as consistent 
with innocent as with criminal activity are unlawful," so that if the observed 
pattern of events "occuned just as frequently or even more than frequently 
, in innocent transactions, the pattern is too equivocal to form the basis for 
such a warrantless arrest." 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 8 3.2(e), at p. 596 (2d ed. 1987). 
5
 The fact that the affiant obtained a warrant in the instant case entitles the 
magistrate's decision to a deferential review. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 
728 (1984). "Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless." United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). See also State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 835 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (Orme, J., concurring) (questioning notion of blind deference to magistrate's 
probable cause determination). This court must still determine whether the information 
supplied by the affiant "picsented a probability that contraband would be found at 
[defendants') residence." State v. Brown, 366 S.E.2d 816, 818 (Ga. App. 1988). 
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informants, and whether the judicial officer issuing the warrant reached a practical, 
common sense decision." State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987)). 
liven assuming arguendo that the confidential informant is reliable because he had 
been employed as such for seven years (Aff. 5), the information he provided the affiant 
does not arise to the level of probable cause. In other words, the proper question this 
Court should ask is not how long the informant had been so employed, but what is the 
basis of his or her knowledge that Hixon was trafficking in narcotics. Did s/he personally 
buy drugs from Hixon or did she observe Hixon sell to others? See, e.g.. State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (t tah 1987) (informant's credibility enhanced because he observed drugs 
in defendant's residence). 
The affiant stated that Richmond told him that the informant had "purchased 
methamphetaminc . . . from two separate suspects. On both occasions [the informant] 
stated to Detective Richmond that both suspects told [the informant] that the 
methamphetamine came from Linda Hixon at her residence." (Aff. 4). At most, this 
information provided a basis for charging the two suspects with possession of controlled 
substances. It did not, however, furnish a ground for issuing a warrant to search 
defendants' residence. In Hansen, the Supreme Court upheld the warrant affidavit 
because: 
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The reliability of the confidential disclosure was . . . enhanced by the 
informant's personal observation of the large quantity of marijuana that was 
being sold in smaller quantities. . . . His information, relied upon by police, 
was not some remote hearsay or assumption based on circumstantial events. 
The statements that the drug and its sale were personally observed in 
defendant's apartment adequately sets forth the informant's basis of 
knowledge. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (citation omitted, emphasis added).6 This case is, therefore, 
clearly distinguishable from the cases discussed above, because the informant had no 
personal knowledge that Hixon sold drugs out of her residence. S/he was merely relaying 
remote hearsay of other unidentified sources. 
Like Utah appellate courts, several other state courts have overwhelmingly required 
that the informant, at the minimum, demonstrate personal knowledge that s^e observed 
or purchased narcotics from the suspect. For example, in State v. Probst 795 P.2d 393 
(Kan. 1990), the warrant affidavit stated that the informant had made a controlled buy from 
the defendant's friend and employer, Warren Cross. The controlled buy took place in an 
alley near the defendant's residence while she was at work. The informant strongly 
6
 See ajso State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (informant gave detailed 
description of his personal observation of stolen property); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258, 1260 (Utah 1983) ("Unlike Aguilar, the affidavit in this case recites that the 
informant personally observed the marijuana"); State v. Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 
35, 36 (Ct. App. 1993) (confidential informants personally orchestrated drug purchase and 
observed drugs at target residence); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(informant personally observed drugs at defendant's residence); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 
284, 287 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citizen informer "had personal knowledge of the 
information he supplied to police"); State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (informant actually made a controlled narcotics buy from the defendant). 
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suspected that the defendant was involved in Cross' illicit sale and distribution of 
methamphctamine. Based on this information, the affiant requested warrants to search 
Cross' and the defendant's residences. The search subsequently uncovered a quantity of 
methamphctamine at the defendant's residence. 
Thereafter, the defendant successfully moved the trial court to suppress the evidence 
on the ground that the warrant lacked probable cause. The Kansas Supreme Court 
affirmed, reasoning that apart from the informant's conclusory allegations, he did not relate 
that he observed or had personal knowledge that the defendant was trafficking in drugs at 
her residence. See id. at 397. 
In State v. White, 720 P.2d 873 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant stated that the officer obtained information from an informant, who 
suspected that the defendants were growing marijuana in their residence. The informant 
claimed to have observed bright lights emanating from the residence. He further claimed 
to have seen heavy foot traffic at the residence and that visitors stayed only for short 
durations. The informant never claimed, however, that he observed or knew that marijuana 
was being grown in the residence. The affiant subsequently verified the information 
provided by the informant. White, 720 P.2d at 874. 
In reversing the defendants' conviction for possession of marijuana, the court noted 
that the informant did not report that he had seen any evidence of criminal activity. 'The 
affidavits only support a suspicion, not a probability, of criminal activity." Id. at 875. The 
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court concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause, because 
"(mjere verification of innocent activity by the police is unilluminating as to any criminal 
activity." Jd.7 
Similarly, in Kvasnikoff v. State, 804 P.2d 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), the court 
found the witness' testimony too conclusory to support probable cause for searching the 
defendant's residence, where "the testimony afforded no assurance that information that 
a particular person had supplied the defendant with cocaine was based on the personal 
knowledge of the peison who supplied the information." id- at 1302, 1308.8 That essential 
element of personal knowledge is also wholly missing in the instant case. The confidential 
informant had no personal knowledge that Hixon was selling drugs out of her residence; 
as such, s/he had no basis for the conclusory allegation. 
Furthermore, the information provided by the "arrested person" that Hixon had sold 
her/him drugs "in the past" is insufficient to support probable cause. Indeed, the arrested 
person occupies a lesser position of trust than the confidential informant. The arrestee 
certainly is neither comparable to an objective citizen-informant, whose testimony is viewed 
7
 See ajso Spinclli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969) ("simple assertion of 
police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for . . . probable cause" and "may [not] be 
used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient"). 
8
 See ajso State v. White, 396 S.E.2d 601, 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (warrant affidavit 
must state whether the infoimant "saw the cocaine in the possession of the suspect, 
[because it| is an essential element in the issuance of a valid search warrant"). 
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"with less rigid scrutiny" because s/he is not expecting any benefit from the police, Brown, 
798 P.2d at 286, nor to a confidential informant, whose reliability and veracity has been well 
demonstrated by his or her past performance, State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 
1984). 
In contrast, the arrestee has never been shown to be reliable and truthful, and s/he 
had every reason to prevaricate to obtain favorable benefits from the State. S/he is 
therefore more properly viewed, in the words of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as a "police 
informer," who supplies information not: 
in the spirit of a concerned citizen, but often in exchange for some 
concession, payment, or simply out of revenge. . . . The nature of these 
persons and the information which they supply convey a certain impression 
of unreliability, and it is proper to demand that some evidence of their 
credibility and reliability be shown. One practical way of making such a 
showing is to point to accurate information which they have supplied in the 
past. 
State v. Paszek, 184 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Wis. 1971). The credibility and veracity of the police 
informant-arrestee was never established; therefore, the information s/he supplied added 
nothing to the warrant affidavit.g 
9
 Hixon notes additionally that the information the arrestee provided is stale in that 
s/he did not say whether Hixon provided him or her with drugs in 1981 or 1991. See, e.g.. 
State v. Turnev, 655 P.2d 358, 361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (allegation that defendant was 
seen "in the past" with drugs, but without any indication as to the dates of such occurrence, 
was "stale" for warrant application purposes). Thus, the arrestee's information is as 
unreliable as, if not more than, that of the confidential informant. 
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2. STAIL CONSTITUTION 
The totality of the circumstances test established in Gates governs federal 
constitutional claims.10 However, Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution, which provides 
broader privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment,11 independently requires that an 
affidavit must establish the basis of an informant's knowledge and his or her reliability and 
veracity. In other woids, stiict satisfaction of the two-pronged test enunciated in Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), should 
continue to govern the validity of informant-based warrant affidavits under the State 
Constitution. 
Article I, Section 14, pi ovides that ". . . no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause suppoited by oath or affiimation. . . . " The provision requires, at least, that the 
affiant, who her/himself is under oath, vouch for the credibility and reliability of the 
informant, who is making unsworn statement. As a corollary, the informant should provide 
information concerning the place, date and time at which s/lie observed the alleged 
10
 See State v. Andeison, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985) (adopting the totality of the 
circumstances test in the context of a federal constitutional claim); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 
284, 285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Utah appellate courts have adopted the totality of the 
circumstances test"). Then see Rosenbaum, 204 UAR at 36 ("Because the affidavit [in this 
case] shows ample piobable cause under either test, we need not determine whether the 
Utah Constitution requires us to choose between themM). 
11
 See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Then see generally POINT IV, 
infra. 
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evidence of criminal activity. See, e.g.. State v. White, 396 S.E.2d 601, 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1990) (affiant must "state when the informant saw the cocaine in the possession of the 
suspect, [because it] is an essential element in the issuance of a valid search warrant.") The 
Aguilar-Spinelli standard provides the courts and police officers with a structure for 
probable cause inquiry which, if not rigidly applied, would allow room for inconsistent 
decisions. See State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984). 
Hixon's argument is not novel. Several state courts have retained, pursuant to state 
constitutions, the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.12 Indeed, Justice Stewart of the Utah 
Supreme Court has characterized this requirement 
[a]s the only real protection that citizens have against an agent of the state 
intruding on the privacy of their homes and effects on only the slightest 
pretext, or even no pretext at all. The basis of the affiant's knowledge must 
be set forth in the affidavit together with some evidence supporting the 
veracity of the informant when the affidavit includes allegations of a 
confidential informant. Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes a 
mere charade, and the basic liberty protected by the [Constitution] would 
constitute an unenforceable right, or, more realistically stated, no right at all. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1101 (Stewart, J., concurring).n 
12
 See, e^ . State v. Cordova, 784 P.2d 30 (N.M. 1989); State v. Janis, 706 P.2d 317 
(Alaska 1985); Commonwealth v. I pton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985); People v. Johnson. 
439 N.E.2d 548 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1985). 
n
 See also Note, Inited States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts 
to Develop State Constitutional Law, 1987 U. 111. L. Rev. 311 (1987) (criticizing Gates for 
not providing adequate guidance to lower courts). Judge Lynn W. Davis has similarly 
observed: 
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Based on the foregoing, this Court should hold that the basis of the informant's 
knowledge was not cleail) established, and therefore the warrant affidavit failed to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 1, Section 14. 
C. Observation of " 1 raffic" Does Not Establish Probable Cause 
Richmond allegedly told the affiant that since February 1991, he had surveilled the 
Hixon residence and had observed people go in and out of the residence. Richmond and 
the affiant subsequent!) continued this surveillance and observed "the same traffic pattern" 
of people visiting foi a shoit period of time. The State will invite this Court to believe that 
such information furnishes a constitutional basis for a search warrant. The overwhelming 
number of courts that have examined the issue ha\e, however, rejected that argument. 
In State v. Buttmgton, 743 P.2d 738 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), the affiant obtained 
information fiom two neighbors who suspected, based on "unusually large amount of traffic 
centered on defendants residence," that the defendant "was selling drugs on a continuous 
Not infrequent!). police confidential informants are part of the criminal 
underworld. I hey cannot be presumed reliable . . . Where a confidential 
infoimant is ielied upon, then the magistiate must be provided with some 
factual basis to gauge the ciedibility-reliability of that person. 
Davis, The Magistenal Role in the Search Warrant Application Proceeding, 4 Utah B.J. 
22, 25 (Oct. 1991). Because of their lack of credibility, one court has even gone as far as 
requiring that an informant must swear under oath before his or her information could 
support the issuance of a warrant. See Merry v. State, 766 P.2d 1377, 1379 (Okl. Crim. 
App. 1988). 
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basis/' ]d. at 741. The affiant verified the information and confirmed that five out of 
about 30 owners of the automobiles that visited the defendant's residence had been 
arrested for narcotics activity. The affidavit contained no information that the defendant 
was known to sell or was observed selling drugs. 
The court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the affidavit contained 
but mere conclusory statements that defendant was selling drugs. It concluded that: 
in the absence of an> evidence that an unusually large number of people 
entering and quickly leaving a residence is in itself an indication of drug 
trafficking, the magistrate was not entitled to draw an inference against 
defendant that would amount to probable cause sufficient to support the 
issuance of a search warrant [under the state constitution). 
Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Brown, 366 S.ti.Zd 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), the affiant averred 
that a concerned citizen suspected that marijuana was being sold out of the defendant's 
residence. As in the instant case, the affiant verified the information, observed traffic at 
the residence, but did not actually see or obtain any information that the defendant sold 
marijuana. The court found that the affidavit gave no information, other than the 
informant's conclusory statements, that contraband might be found at the defendant's 
residence. T h e observation of activity that fits a 'drug traffic pattern' raises at most a 
mere suspicion that contraband is being kept on the premises, and does not amount to 
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probable cause to search the home." id. at 819 (emphasis in original). Accord, State v. 
Kanda, 620 P.2d 1072 (Haw. 1980).14 
As in the cases discussed above, the affidavit in the instant case totally lacked 
probable cause. The affiant provided essentially what amounts to conclusory statements 
concerning observation of heavy traffic at the Hixon residence. Throughout their 
surveillance, neither the affiant nor Richmond actually observed any activities tending to 
show that evidence of narcotics sale would be found in the residence. The affiant stated 
that they spent approximately three (3) months surveilling defendants' premises. However, 
during the three-month period, they observed no activities at the residence indicative of 
14
 As demonstrated above, the overwhelming number of courts that have considered 
the issue have concluded that mere observation of heavy traffic at a particular residence, 
whether or not corroborated by the police, is insufficient to find probable cause. 
In cases where the affiant alleged observation of unusual or heavy traffic, the courts 
have required, for probable cause purposes under the Constitution, independent 
information tending to show that evidence of criminal activity had also been observed in 
the place to be searched. See, e^ g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (affidavit 
showed informant had actually purchased narcotics from defendant and other sources 
corroborated informant), overruled other grounds. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980); State v. Chapman, 783 P.2d 771 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (corroboration by 
defendant's children that defendant kept white powdery substance at home); State v. Payne, 
773 P.2d 122 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (corroboration by police after observing evidence of 
growing marijuana at defendant's residence ); State v. Berardinelli, 769 P.2d 235 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989) (informant actually observed controlled buy). Cf. State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 
(Utah 1971) (finding probable cause where informant had purchased marijuana on several 
occasions from defendant's residence). 
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narcotics sale. Nor was there any indication that the informant saw any drugs being sold, 
the amount seen, or whether Hixon was the seller. 
The affiant's statements concerning traffic were merely naked and conclusory 
assertions. Further, neither the informant nor the arrestee provided any reliable 
information concerning sale of drugs. Courts have generally concluded that "it is 
impermissible to issue a warrant on the basis of informant's statements which are purely 
'conclusory and do[ j not explain how [the informant) reached that conclusion.'" Buffington, 
743 P.2d at 740 (citation omitted). 
Thus, the information provided by the affiant and the informants in the instant case, 
either alone or in the aggregate, or under the totality test or the Aguilar-Spinelli test, does 
not furnish probable cause for a search warrant. Because the affidavit underlying the 
search warrant lacked probable cause under state and federal constitutions, the district 
court should have ordered the evidence suppressed. 
POINT 11 
THE LEON EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
UNDER FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE 
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE AS TO RENDER OFFICIAL BELIEF IN ITS EXISTENCE 
UNREASONABLE. 
In United Stales v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that 
evidence seized in reliance upon a warrant, including those lacking in probable cause, 
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would not be suppiessed so long as the executing officers were acting in good faith. The 
Court, however, noted that not all deficient warrants would avoid Fourth Amendment 
sanction: 
The exception . . . will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate 
wholly abandoned his judicial role. . . . Nor would an officer manifest 
objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
unieasonable.' 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).1' 
The Leon exception should not apply in the instant case because the affidavit was 
"bare bones" and at best conclusory in that it failed to specify if diugs were observed or 
the amount of drugs observed in the Hixon residence. It did not mention whether there 
was an amount of diugs sufficient to support a belief that it was held for personal use or 
distribution. Such an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of piobable cause that no reasonable 
police officei should rely on it. See State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W.Va. 1986). 
In State v. Dionebuig. 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the affiant received 
information fiom an infoimant that a quantity of mcthamphetamine was to be delivered 
to a residence in Panguilch. Utah. Four days later, the informant again contacted the 
officer to notify him that the individual with the drugs had departed California and would 
be arriving in Panguitch between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. that day. Based on that 
IS
 Utah appellate courts have not adopted the Leon good faith exception under the 
state constitution. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991). 
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information, a warrant was obtained and executed by the affiant when a pick-up truck with 
California license plates pulled into the residence at 3:00 p.m. 
Referring to the state's concession that the affidavit was invalid, this Court held: 
(T]he State concedes . . . and we agree, that the conclusory statements 
contained in [the affiant's] affidavit are inadequate to constitute probable 
cause to scaich. The State also concedes that the "good faith" exception of 
Leon is inapplicable, presumably because the affidavit is "so lacking in 
probable cause" that it was umeasonable for the officer who prepared the 
affidavit to iely on a warrant issued on the strength of it. 
id. at 1305. In addition, this Court found that the affidavit was deficient "as to how much 
controlled substance to expect or who was to deliver or receive it." id. 
The facts of the instant case compel the same conclusion reached by all parties in 
Droneburg. As in that case, the officer here had no facts to substantiate the hearsay from 
the infoimant and the arrestee that Hixon was selling methamphetamine. Further, the 
information concerning heavy foot traffic provided by the affiant did not rise to the level 
of probable cause. Ihe affiant had no infoimation whatsoever that would assist him in 
determining that there was a probability that drugs would be located in the residence. It 
simply was not objectively reasonable for the affiant to rely on an affidavit containing 
conclusory heaisay statements, which added up to nothing but mere naked assertions. This 
- 2 3 -
court should therefore reverse the district court and find Leon inapplicable under these 
circumstances.16 
POINT 111 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LEON EXCEPTION AND ITS 
APPLICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, NO SUCH 
EXCEPTION EXISTS UNDER ARTICLE 1 SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the Supreme Court 
established a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant.17 The Leon good faith exception, however, has almost been 
16
 Additionally, the magistrate in this case merely rubber-stamped the conclusions 
drawn by the affiant, thus rendering Leon inapplicable. There were no independent facts 
confirming the affiant's conclusions that drugs would be found in defendants' residence. 
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
17
 In 1914, the Court held that the rule barred the use of illegally obtained evidence 
in federal courts. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 384, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). Prior to 
Weeks, only the states of Iowa and Vermont constitutionally barred the use of illegally 
obtained evidence in their courts. See State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903), 
overruled. State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530 (Iowa 1923); State v. Salmon, 50 A. 1097 (Vt. 
1901). Then, in 196 L the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment similarly forbids 
the admission of illegally obtained evidence in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). 
Utah courts did not adopt the exclusionary rule until 1963, when the supreme court 
decided State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963), vacated on other grounds, 
397 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 87 (1964). Nevertheless, there is no longer a doubt that "exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, 
section 14" of the Utah Constitution. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). 
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swallowed up by several exceptions to it, thus rendering constitutional analysis of propriety 
of search warrants more confusing than ever.1* In fact, Utah appellate courts have 
seriously questioned Leon's analysis and have indicated a general dissatisfaction with its 
"good faith" exception.1" 
Because of the fundamental purpose of the exclusionary rule in protecting citizens 
from unconstitutional searches, several sister state courts have rejected the Leon exception 
ls
 See, e^ . Stale v. Roue. 806 P.2d 730, 736 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting courts 
and commentators have criticized Leon), overruled other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 
(Utah 1992); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185 & n.2 (Utah 1987) (actually criticizing 
Leon for overbreadth). Cf. ajso State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) (confusing 
state of federal law ground for independent interpretation of state constitution). 
The exceptions to the "good faith" exception include situations where (1) the affiant 
misled the issuing magistrate, f ranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978); (2) 
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role and became a partisan ally of the 
government, Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S. Ct. 2319 (1979); (3) the 
officer did not have a reasonable belief that the warrant was valid. Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975); and (4) the warrant is so facially deficient in particularity, 
so that no reasonable officer could presume it valid, Leon, 468 II.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 
3420. See generally State v. Morton. 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(describing scenarios under which good faith exception will not apply). 
10
 See supra note 18. In Rowe, after conducting an extensive review of the history of 
the exclusionary within the context of an invalid warrant, the court concluded that: 
when the appellate courts of this state are squarely confronted with the 
question of whether the exclusionary rule existing by virtue of Article 1, 
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is subject to a Leon-type "good faith" 
exception, a healthy skepticism should permeate the courts' consideration in 
view of the troublesome analysis in Leon. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 743 ("Appendix - The Trouble with Leon"), overruled other grounds, 
196 UAR at 14. 
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and have concluded that the rule excludes illegally obtained evidence at criminal trials.20 
Thus, this Court will not be embarking on a radical turf in finding Leon inapplicable under 
Article L Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, particularly in light of Utah courts' strong 
preference for searches conducted in accordance with constitutional precepts.21 
Apart from the confusion in federal law wrought by the exceptions to the good faith 
exception, several other flaws exist in Leon. The principal rationale for the decision is that 
20
 See, c ^ . Commonwealth v. Ldmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991) (interpreting 
article 1, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution); State v. Marsalla, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 
1990) (interpreting article 1, section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution, which is slightly 
different from the Utah provision): State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) 
(interpreting article 1, section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, which is radically 
different from Utah's provision); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987) (inter-
preting article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, which is almost Utah's 
provision verbatim); People v. Sellars, 394 N.W.2d 133 (Mich.App. 1986) (interpreting 
article 1, section 11 of the Michigan Constitution, which is slightly different from the Utah 
provision), relying on People v. Sherbine, 364 N.W.2d 658 (Mich. 1984); Stringer v. State, 
491 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring) (interpreting article 3, section 23 
of the Mississippi Constitution, which is slightly different from the Utah provision); State 
v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1985) (interpreting article 1, section 12 of the 
New York Constitution, which is I'tah provision verbatim); State v. Grawien, 367 N.W.2d 
816 (Wis. 1985) (interpreting article 1, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which 
substantially is Utah provision verbatim), relying on Hover v. State, 193 N.W. 89, 92 (Wis. 
1923); State v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1984) (declining to adopt Leon). But see 
People v. Stewart, 473 N.L.2d 1227 (III. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985); State v. 
Shannon, 471 So.2d 286 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 476 So.2d 286 (La. 1985); State v. 
Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1985); State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1984). 
21
 See infra text accompanying notes 45 and 46. Cf. also Rowe, 806 P.2d at 737 n.8 (it 
is far from clear whethei Leon is applicable under Utah constitution and there may well 
be ground for finding it inapplicable); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991) 
(the good faith exception does not apply under state constitution to subpoenas illegally 
issued to defendants' banks). 
since the Fourth Amendment does not expressly contain an exclusionary rule, see jd. at 906, 
"the marginal or non-existent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify 
the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922. The Court so held despite its awareness that 
researchers "have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule is insubstantial." ]d. 
at 908. 
First, there is an inconsistency between the "substantial" costs of the exclusionary 
rule and the "insubstantial" effect of the rule, as found by the Court. See Marsalla, 579 
A.2d at 64. Professor LaFa\e has concluded that "|t)o date, the most careful and balanced 
assessment of all available empirical data shows 'that the general level of the rule's effect 
on criminal prosecution is marginal at most.'"22 
Second, the Leon Court's measure of the "substantial" cost of the exclusionary rule 
is based on a faulty assessment of the effect of the rule "in a]i cases, irrespective of the 
circumstances that led to exclusion,"2* instead of the rule's effect in those cases in which 
evidence was suppressed though the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner. 
Marsalla, 579 A.2d at 65. "|H|ad the Court's 'cost' inquiry been properly focused, it would 
have been apparent that the relevant costs arc insubstantial."24 
22
 1 W. LaFa\e. Search and Seizure § 1.3(c), p.52 (2d ed. 1987) (citation omitted). 
2
* Leon, 468 U.S. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
24
 LaFave, supra note 22. 
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Third, the Leon Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule in warrant cases as if the 
rule is somehow unconnected to the Fourth Amendment2* is unjustifiable. "Much of the 
criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly directed at the 
fourth amendment itself. . . . The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of 
the police. The fourth amendment does."26 All the exclusionary rule does is help enforce 
and preserve the integrity of the fourth amendment prohibition of all illegal searches.27 
Furthermore, contiary to the Leon Court, the primary objective of the rule is not 
simply to deter police misconduct, but to give meaning to the constitutional prohibition 
against unreasonable seaiches and seizures, regardless of the official responsible for the 
illegal conduct. See I'nited States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356, 94 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1974) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).:s To refuse to apply the rule in the face of a defective warrant 
would, therefore, be "to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open 
25
 See LaFave, supra note 22, at 53. 
26
 Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 
1392-93 (1983). 
27
 See Wasserstrom and Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But was it a 
Fair Trial9," 22 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 85, 109 (1984). 
2S
 Cf. Note, The Fuluie of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State 
Constitutional Law. 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 377, 393 ("The significance of the exclusionary 
rule . . . lies in the fact that it serves to protect constitutional rights without the need for 
judicial intervention"): Wasserstrom and Mertens, supra note 27, at 106 ("it is somewhat 
odd to suppose that the exclusionary rule was not designed to deter the issuance of invalid 
warrants"). 
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defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people 
against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S. Ct. 341 
(1914); accord. Hover v. State, 193 N.W. 89, 92 (Wis. 1923). Thus, the exclusionary rule 
should itself be considered a constitutional requirement and part and parcel of article 1, 
section 14.:<* 
Furthermore, several reasons obviate the need for a "good faith" exception under 
article 1, section 14/° First, the exception encourages magistrate shopping in that police 
need only concern themselves with obtaining a warrant, not a constitutionally sound one.31 
Second, the exception essential!) sends a signal to "magistrates that they need not take 
much care in reviewing warrant application, since their mistakes will from now on have 
virtually no consequence. . . ." Leon, 468 U.S. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By 
adopting the exception, a court reviewing a search warrant case will be relegated to the role 
ll)
 In Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule is a necessary 
consequence of police violation of article 1, section 14. The court, however, declined to 
conclude whether the rule is a constitutional requirement or a mere judicial remedy, 
because the case before it did not squarely present the issue. "We simply hold that [the 
exclusionary rule] exists." ]d. at 473. 
The instant case squarely addresses that issue: if the exclusionary rule, as Hixon 
argues, is constitutionally mandated under article 1, section 14, then the Leon good faith 
exception and its concomitant primary objective of deterring police misconduct clearly 
becomes irrelevant and inapplicable. A defective warrant, whether or not obtained by an 
officer in good faith, ought to be excluded at criminal trials. 
M)
 See generally Rowe, 806 P.2d at 737 n.9 (there may well be reason for Utah courts 
to deviate from applying Ixon under the state constitution). 
M
 See Marsalla, 579 A.2d at 67; Wasserstrom and Mertens, supra note 27, at 109. 
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of merely determining whether a police officer acted in good faith, thus precluding a strict 
constitutional review of piobable cause/2 
Finally, the text of article 1, section 14, seems reasonably clear on whether a good 
faith belief on the part of an officer exempts him or her or the issuing magistrate from the 
sanction of the exclusionary rule: "|Njo warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation. . . ." Utah Const, art. 1, § 14 (emphasis added). The 
text clearly demonstrates that ""its purpose plainly was to prohibit the issuance of warrants 
that did not satisfy its requirements of probable cause and particularity/" Marsalla, 579 
A.2d at 66 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should independently interpret article 1, section 
14 from the Fourth Amendment, and conclude that the Leon "good faith" exception does 
not apply in I tab. In so holding, this Court will only be reaffirming the supreme court's 
u
 Marsalla, 579 A.2d at 67; Note, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the 
Development of State Constitutional Law, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 377, 393. 
For a perceptive criticism of Leon's "good faith" exception, see Justice Robertson's 
concurring opinion in Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1986). Justice Robertson, 
in agreeing that Leon places the "integrity of the criminal justice" in jeopardy, reasoned 
that Weeks remains a persuasive opinion. See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356-58, 94 S. Ct. 
at 624-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He contended that there needed to be a remedy 
against a magistrate who makes an erroneous probable cause determination. He argued 
that only few prosecutions were hindered by the application of the rule and that Leon is 
more of a "judicial/political ideology than a judicial response to a demonstrable and felt 
societal needs." Justice Robertson then asks rhetorically: "If it ain't broken, why fix it?" 
Chiding the Court's cost-benefit-interest analysis, he concluded that Leon is "defensible 
only if we are prepared to rename the first ten amendments the Bill of Interests." Stringer, 
491 So.2d at 846-50 & n. 6 (Robertson, J., concurring). 
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conclusion that the exclusionary rule is a necessar)' consequence of police violation of 
article 1, section 14. See State v. larocco, 796 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990): Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Utah. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992)." 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT SHOULD INDEPENDENTLY INTERPRET ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION FROM THE 
INTERPRETATION GIVEN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY THE 
UNTIED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
Although Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is Fourth Amendment 
verbatim, this court should independently interpret that provision from the interpretation 
given the amendment by the United States Supreme Court.u Pursuant to the primacy 
model of constitutional interpretation/' the Utah Constitution should be the primary 
source for protecting citizens' rights. Secondly, independent interpretation by this court will 
foster predictability and "insulate|s| the states' citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
" lor a contrary \iew. see Cassell, Taking the Utah Constitution Seriously: An 
Examination of the Mysterious Creation of Utah's Exclusionary Rule (to be published 1993 
Utah L. Rev. ). 
'
4
 See Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah 1992); State v. Earl 
716 P.2d 803, 806 (I'tah 1986); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cases 
imploring lawyers to brief Utah courts on state constitutional issues, particularly at the trial 
court level). 
^ The primacy model posits that, because several state constitutions predate the federal 
constitution, "state constitutions should be looked to first in developing protections for 
individual rights." Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 
1986 Utah L.Rcv. 319, 326 n.34. See also Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States' Bills of Rights. 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 380 (1980). 
-31 -
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts."*6 Thirdly, such 
independent interpietation will positively reinvigoratc the state's sovereignty under our 
federal system of government.*" More importantly, article 1, section 14, should be 
interpieted diffeientl) fiom the fourth amendment because of the following reasons: 
A. Utah's I pique History 
No other tenitoi) experienced the difficulties encountered by Utah before obtaining 
statehood. The difficulties stemmed mainly from the settlers' practice of slavery and 
polygamy, the twin "sins" that made Congress look unfavorably towards granting statehood 
to the territory.** 
Utahns drafted seven constitutions before the state was admitted into the Union. 
The first, the Constitution of Deseret of 1849, served as the model for other Utah 
constitutions/0 There is disagreement, however, on whether the 1849 Constitution was 
patterned after the Illinois Constitution of 18184u or the Iowa Constitution of 1846.41 
* State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988). 
r
 See Linde, siipia note 35, at 383. 
iH
 See K. Firmagc and R. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 127 (Univ. Illinois Press 1988); 
Flynn, Federalism and Viable State (iovernmcnt-The History of Utah's Constitution, 1966 
Utah L. Rev. 311, 316; Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 45 (1954) (unpublished thesis 
in University of Utah Library). 
V)
 See Flynn, supra note 38, at 315; Hickman, supra note 38, at 42. 
40
 See id. (arguing Illinois). 
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Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the last Utah constitution, adopted in 1896, borrowed 
heavily from the constitutions of Nevada, Washington, Illinois and New York.42 
Utah's constitutions, like many other state constitutions drafted in the nineteenth 
centur>', reflect the pie\ailing sentiment of deep mistrust of the government.4* Article 8 
of the 1849 Constitution, for example, prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures,44 
and subsequent Utah constitutions similarly prohibited such searches. Historically, Utah 
judges have never hesitated in finding unconstitutional searches conducted on less than 
probable cause or statutes authorizing them.4* 
The utmost devotion by these judges to constitutionally sound searches stemmed 
apparently from their unique experience as citizens of the Utah territory.46 As mentioned 
41
 See Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret, 29 B.Y.U. Studies 7, 15 
(1989), stating that several articles in the 1849 Constitution were copied "word for word" 
from the Iowa Constitution, which today is federal and Utah constitutions verbatim. 
4:
 See generally I lynn, supia note 38, at 323. 
4
* See id. at 314. 
44
 See Crawley, supia note 41, at 16. Unfortunately, as of today, research has not 
discovered a contempoianeous legislative debate on the adoption of this provision. 
Nonetheless, it is well documented that residents of the Utah territory were generally 
familiar with unconstitutional seaiches and the constitutions of other states prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Kins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 Hist. Q. 95, 100 
(1957); Flynn, supra note 38. 
4<i
 See generally Hickman, supra note 38, at 386-90. 
4()
 It is no longei folklore that early Mormon settlers were intolerantly driven to the 
territory from New York, Illinois, Missouri and Pennsylvania. See Firmage and Mangrum, 
supra note 38, at 125-27. 
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earlier, the settlers widely practiced polygamy, a "relief] of barbarism" that Congress was 
determined to stamp out.4 Therefore, it is not uncommon for federal marshals, in blatant 
violation of the fourth amendment, to break into churches and homes during the day or 
at night in search of poI)gamists.4* To the dismay of early Utahns, night time search, "the 
evil in its most obnoxious form,"4' was conducted with great frequency and without 
probable cause/0 A frustrated and wear) Mormon leader once decried these searches as 
a "perversion of the Constitution."*1 Article 1, Section 14, thus, is not a wholesale 
adoption of the seaich and seizure provisions of other state 
47
 Hickman, supra note 38, at 45; Firmage and Mangrum, supra note 38, at 127, 160. 
4K
 See, e.g., Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q. 
133, 142 (1983) (recounting how the home of a polygamist was searched 100 times in four 
years). See also "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 20, 1886, at 1 (recounting 
how federal marshals clearly engaged in unconstitutional search of a polygamist's home by 
breaking the door with an axe without the authority of a warrant). 
Professor Firmage similarly observes that during the nineteenth century "federal 
attempts to simplify and expedite the conviction of polygamists routinely denied Mormons 
of many of their fundamental rights/' Firmage, Religion and the Law: The Mormon 
Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 781 (1991). 
4g
 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210, 81 S. Ct. 473, 496 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). Sec aJso State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) ("entry into an 
occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than 
entry executed during the daytime"). 
50
 See Deseret News Weekly, Jan 20, 1886, at 1; Jan. 27, 1886, at 26; June 10, 1885, at 
1. 
M
 First President') Message to General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, Deseret News Weekly, April 13 & 14, 1886, at 196 (quoted in 
Wallentine, Heeding the Call. Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 14. 17 J. Contemp. Law 267, 279 n. 80 (1991)). 
- 3 4 -
constitutions, but a reflection of the deep distrust of Utahns for government and for 
unreasonable searches or those conducted without probable cause/2 
B. Propriety of Review Under the f ederal System 
In our federal system, it is entirely proper for a state court to interpret its 
constitution in a mannci different from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation 
of a similar federal provision.M In the recent past, state courts have been interpreting 
their constitutions differently from federal interpretation to provide broader protections to 
their citizens/4 
The Utah Supieme Court has not been hesitant in independently interpreting the 
Utah Constitution in a bioad range of issues/' In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
^ $££ Hickman, supia note 38. at 386-90. 
" Sec Fox Film Corp. v. Mullet. 296 U.S. 207, 56 S. Ct. 183 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn, 
324 U.S. 117, 125, 65 S. Ct. 459, 463 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n. 379 
U.S. 487, 489. 85 S. Ct. 493, 494 (1965); see a]so State v. Marsalla, 579 A.2d 58, 63 (Conn. 
1990) (in interpieting its ov\n constitution, a state court sits as "a court of last resort, 
subject only to the qualification that |its] interpretations may not restrict the guarantees 
accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter."). See generally Durham, 
Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah B.J. 25 (Nov. 1989). Bat cf. Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983) (admonishing state courts to make clear 
and concise statement of independent ground of their decision). 
54
 See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From A Reactionary Approach, 
9 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: 
State Courts Erosion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421, 425 (1974). 
^ See Comment, supra note 35. at 320 (chronicling independent interpretation by the 
Utah Supreme Court on right of access to preliminary hearings, parental rights, separation 
of power, self-incrimination and standing). 
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1990), the court departed fiom confusing and irreconcilable federal automobile search and 
seizure jurispiudence.'" It held that under article 1, section 14, a warrantless automobile 
search is per se unconstitutional except when effectuated with probable cause and to 
"protect safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." Id- at 
470. More recently, the Court similarly held that the exclusionary rule applies under the 
Utah Constitution in quasi-criminal tax stamp cases. See Zissi v. State Tax ComnVn of 
Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992) ("Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule prevents] the 
Commission from admitting in evidence drugs (illcgall)] taken from [the suspectj's car."). 
Therefore, it is pioper for this Court to similarly depart from federal law and 
conclude that article 1. section 14, independently mandate that (1) the Aguillar-Spinelli 
standard continues to govern the validity of informant-based warrants affidavits, and (2) the 
Leon good faith exception does not apply in Utah. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the arguments presented above, Hixon hereby urges this Court to reverse 
the district courts refusal to suppiess the evidence seized from her residence. 
56
 See also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986) ("fourth 
amendment rules governing police conduct have been muddied and judicial supervision of 
the warrant process diluted"), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1091, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987). 
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RKOLEST FOR ORAL ARCLMENT 
Counsel herein requests oral aigument in this matter. 
RLSPliCTI I LLY SI BMIITLD this day of March, 1993. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CLKTU 1CAR: OF SLRV1CE 
I hereby dedaie that 1 delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief, this dav of March, 1993, to David B. Ihompson, Assistant 
Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, I'tah, 84114. 
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ADDENDUM A 
ENTRY OF PLEA TRANSCRIPT 
l| P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 I THE COURT: This was the time fixed for trial in 
4 Criminal Case 91-35, State of Utah vs. Linda Lee Hixon. 
5 MR. YENGICH: Yes, your H o n o r — 
6 THE COURT: Gentlemen, I — I — 
7 MR. YENGICH: — R o n Yengich on behalf of Ms. Hixon. 
8 THE COURT: —understand that some kind of a 
9 disposition has been worked out relative to this case; is 
JQ that correct? 
]j MR. YENGICH: That's correct, your Honor. 
12 In this matter, it's our understanding that 
13 M s . — M r s . Hixon will enter a plea of guilty to Count I of 
14 the Information, under State vs. Sery. There was a motion 
15 to suppress that was filed in this matter and this Court 
jg denied that motion to suppress. It is the intention of the 
17 defendant to take that issue under Sery to the Court of 
18 Appeals. 
19 The further agreement in this matter is 
20 incorporated into a written statement. The other counts in 
2i this matter will be dismissed a n d — u p o n the entry of the 
22 plea. 
23 THE COURT; Is that correct, Mr. Anderson? 
24 MR, ANDERSON: Yes. Yes, the other counts, your 
25 I Honor, are misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 
2 
1 charged with possession of paraphernalia and one simple 
2 possession of methamphetamine, which would h<?ve been a 
3 third-degree felony. 
4 * THE COURT: I see. And it was all basically one 
5 transaction, I notice they were all alleged to have occurred 
6 on the same date and so on? 
7 MR. ANDERSON; Yes. Those were all things that 
8 were found at the same time when the search warrant was 
9 executed. 
10 THE COURT: I understand. 
11 All right. Mrs. Hixon, then, to Count I of the 
12 second amended Information, it alleges that you unlawfully 
13 possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
14 this being a second-degree felony alleged to have occurred 
15 on or about April 5th of 1991, involving some methamphetamin^; 
16 what is your plea? Guilty or not guilty? 
17 MS. HIXON: Guilty, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Now, Ms. Hixon, your counsel has just 
19 handed me what is entitled Statement of Defendant, and which 
20 is accompanied with a plea agreement that your counsel has 
21 signed. 
22 Do you recall going over those statements? 
23 MS. HIXON: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: And they were explained to you? 
25 MS. HIXON: Yes. 
1 would be an additional sentence, which of course, whatever 
2 we do in this case would be taken into account at that time 
3 of that sentencing if there was a conviction in that case. 
4 So, any legal reason to state, Mr. Yengich, why 
5 sentence shouldn't be pronounced at this time? 
6 MR. YENGICH: I know of no legal cause, other than 
7 to note to the Court that this was a Sery plea, and I 
8 think the Court is aware of that. 
9 THE COURT: It will be the judgment and sentence 
10 of the Court, Ms. Hixon, that you will be imprisoned in the 
11 Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one nor more 
12 than 15 years. 
13 Further, that you pay a fine in the amount of 
14 $1,000, together with the 25 percent assessment required by 
15 law. 
16 The Court will stay the execution of the prison 
17 sentence, will place you on probation with the Department 
18 of Adult Probation & Parole for a period of three years. 
19 As a condition of that probation, you will sign the 
20 agreement required by the Department, live up to all of 
21 its terms and conditions. 
22 As a further condition to your probation, you will 
23 serve 90 days in the Grand County Jail, and that sentence 
24 will commence at 9:00 a.m. on December the 26th is when 
25 y o u ' l l r e p o r t . 
22 
ADDENDUM B 
WARRANT AFFIDAVIT 
IN THK JUSTICE COURT 
1M AND FOR TIIB GRAND COUNTY, BTATK OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ea 
County of Grand ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
,y. . • 
BEFORE: :: K£is^<- U. Rovers . Po goLd r Y^QAyttoi . UfrJ* JUDGE U ADDRESS 
The undersigned a f f iant being f i r s t duly sworn* deposes and says! 
That lie has reason to bel ieve 
That ( ) on the person(s) of 
(X) in the vehlcle(s) described ad ALL VEHICLES PARKED 
ON THK PREMISES FURTHER DESCRIBED AS A 1972 BROWN FORD PICK-UP 
UTAH LICENSE NUMBER NW 2163, A BLUE FORD PICK-UP,LICENSE UNKNOWN, 
A WHITE FORD TIEMPO COLORADO SHK2B0,A 197B GREEN CHEVROLET VAN 
>™L.J;t.;?HS?...HtJMBER..yW5540.i7r&i ^gkfflSgk Tfl^-.L UNKNOWN, A 1969 PONTIAC GTO UrAH LICENSE NUMBER N6S32l,u 
HARLEY DAVIDSON XLH UTAH LICENSE NUMBER 343CM,A 19B2 FORD RHOON 
UTAH LICENSE NUMBER LLR661,A 1975 FORD PlCK-UP UTAH LICENSE 
NUMBER 1007CA,A 1975 FORD PICK-UP UTAH LICENSE NUMBER 1231RP AND 
ANY OTHER OPRRARI.B OR INOPERABLE VEHICLE PARKED ON THE PREMISES 
OR THAT ARRIVES ON THE PREMISES WHILE OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. 
(X) on the premises known as 153 BAST 300 NORTH, FURTHER 
DESCRIBED AS A WHITE TWO STORY HOUSE WITH BLUB TRIM ON THE 
WINDOWS AMD WITH A METAL CHIMNEY PROTRUDtNG FROM THB SOUTHEAST 
mRHER OF THB HOUSE. IDE BAST SIDE DOOR HAS A BLUB AND WHITE 
AWNING OVER THE ENTRY WAY . ALSO ON THE PREMISES IB A WHITE ONE 
STORY BUILDING LOCATED SEPARATE FROM AND NORTHEAST OF THB TWO 
STORY UmiSE, AN UNATTACHED BROWN COLORED TOP AND (X)NCRRTE BOTTOM 
OARAGE LOCATED BAST OF THB IFJUSB NEXT TO THE DRIVEWAY AND AM, OP 
THE CURTILAGE ON HIE ABOVE NAMED PREHtSBS. 
In the City of MOAB, County of Grand, State of Utah, 
there In now certain property of evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT A 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or 1B unlawfully possessed; 
(X) hna been uoed to commit or conceal a public 
offense; 
(X) la being possessed with the purpose to uae it as n 
means of committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of 
illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the 
illegal conduc t; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of 
Illegal conduct, possessed by a person or entity 
not a party to the illegal conduct. ( Note 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 77-23-3(2) ) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(o) of DIBTRIBUTION/POSBBSSIOH/MANUFACTURR 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: YOUR AFFIANT, SERGEANT JOE CHRtSTMAN IS CURRRHTLY 
EMPLOYED WITH THE UTAH DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION ASSIGNED TO TlfR 
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT BURBAU, CLANDESTINE DRUG IABORAT0RY 
SECTION. YOUR AFFIANT HAS BEBN A POLICE OFFICER FOR OVRR 10 YEARS 
AND HAS WORKED NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 3 \/'? 
YRARS INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBBTANCRB 
ALT SPECIFICALLY THE DISTRIBUTION, POSSESSION, AND MANUFACTUUINO 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING OF OVER 200 HOURS 
IN THR INVESTIGATION OF NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS FROM TIlR DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DRA). THIS TRAINING INCLUDED 
COMPLETION OF THE DEA BASIC NARCOTICS INVESTIGATORS COURSE, THR 
CANNAIHS ERADICATION AND DETECTION COURSE, THE CIANDRSTIN8 DRUG 
I.ADORATORY INVESTIGATION AND CERTIFICATION COURSE OTHER TRAINING 
lNCU'DRD COMPLETION OF THR CALIFORNIA DRPT. OF JUSTICE 
CLANDRSTINR LAB INVRSTIGATION COURSE, 1HB U.S. DEPARTHRNT OF 
JUSTICE NARmTIC INVESTIGATORS COURSE AND THR ROOKY M(JUNTAtN 
INFORMATION NETWORK CLANDESTINE I.AB INVESTIGATORS COURSE. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS INITIATED OR HAS ASBIBTRD IN OVRR 100 NARCOTtCS 
INV FBI* I GAT IONS WRING THR PAST T1IRKB YEARS. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS INSTRUCTRD OTHER POLICE OFFICERS IN THR 
INVESTIGATIONS OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND CLANDESTINE M B 
INVESTIGATIONS THROUGHOUT UTAH. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS TESTIFIED IN JUSTICE,CIRCUIT AND FEDERAL COURTS 
HAS AN EXPERT WITNESS IN NARCOTICS RBIATBD CASES. 
PAGE TIIREK 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
IN MOVBMBRR 1990 YOUR AFFIANT WAS CONTACTED BY DETBCTIVR RON 
RICHMOND OF THE FOUR-CORNERS NARCOTICS TASK FORCE CONCERNING A 
PURCHASE OF CHEMICALS FROH INTBRTBC CHEMICAL IN ORBM. UTAH HY 
IARIIY HIXON OF MOAB, IFTAH. YOUR AFFIANT WAS INFORMED BY DETECTIVE 
RICHMOND THAT LARRY HIXON PURCHASED 1 GALLOM OF IP/DRIODIC ACID 
FROM JNTERTEC aiEMlCAL ON MARCH 7 1990. THE TRANSACTION BURET 
FROM 1NTBRTEC LISTS T1JB NAME OF THE BUYER AS "BLAH ROCK MINING" 
OF PRICE, UTAH. TJU? TELEPHONE NUMBER LISTED WAS " 695-6600*. HIE 
LISTED FORM OF IDENTIFICATION WAS UTAH ID It 6085968. 
YOUR AFFIANT CONDUCTED ROUTINE VERIFICATION ClffiCRS WITH DOTH THE 
CARBON AND GRAND COUNTY CLERKS OFFICE AND WAS UNABLE TO FIND A 
BUSINESS LICENSE LISTED FOR " SLAB ROCK MINING" OR LARRY HIXON 1H 
EITHER COUNTY. A CHECK WITH THE PRICB CITY CLERKS OFFICE PROVIDED 
NO RECORD OF A BUSINESS LICENSE LISTED WITHIN PRICB CITY. 
YOUR AFFIANT CHECKED THE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AND DIRECTORY 
ASSISTANCE FOR A LISTING OF " 595-6688" IN EITHER CARBON OR GRAND 
COUNTY AND LRARNED THAT "GBS-eeeB" IS NOT A VALID TELEPHONE 
NUMBER. 
YOUR AFFIANT ClffiCRBD TIU? UTAH DRIVER LICENSE AND IDENTIFICATION 
FILES AND IOCATED A DRIVER LICENSE IN Tin? NAME OF LARRY HIXON OF 
BOX 14 MOAB,UTAH 84532 UNDBR THE NUMBER 0F"60B5968". 
YOUR AFFIANT WAS TOLD BY DEPUTY JOIN MCGANN OF Tin? GRAND COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE THAT THE MORE COMMON NAME ASSOCIATED WITH 1.ARRY 
IIIXOH IS " SLICK ROCK MINING" LOCATED IN MOAB. YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS 
THROUGH INVESTIGATION THAT THE LIBTBD PHONE NUMBER, ADDRESS, AND 
ZIP CODR ON THE REGULATED TRANSACTION FORM ARB FICTITIOUS. 
YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING THAT PERSONS 
WHO PURCHASE CHEMICALS FOR TIU? PURPOSE OF MANUFACTURING 
MRTHAMPHRTAMINB OFTEN LIST FICTITIOUS INFORMATION TO AVOID 
DETECTION FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING THAT HYDRIODIC 
ACID IN 57% CONCENTRATION IB A LtSTRD ESSENTIAL CHEMICAL UTILIZED 
IN THE MANUFACTURE OF MBTHAMPHBTAMINB. YOUR APF1ANT HAS BEEN IN 
SEVERAL CLANDESTINE DRUG LABORATORIES WHERE HYDRIODIC AC!I) WAS 
USED TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHBTAMlNB AND YOUR AFP!ANT HAS USED 
HYDRIODIC ACID IN THE MANUFACTURE OP MRTHAMPHETAMINE IN A POLICE 
LABORATORY TRAINING SESSION. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS PERSONAL KNOWLRDGB THROUGH SURVEILLANCE, SERVICE 
OF SEARCH WARRANTS, AND OTin?R INFORMATION THAT PERSONS WHO ARE 
MANUFACTURING MBTHAMPHETAMINE FOR SALE GO TO INTERTEC CHEMICAL 
FOR THE H'RPOSB OF PURCHASING I.AB0RATORY APPARATUSES, 01 .ABBWARR, 
AND CIMMICAIS, WHICH ARE USED IN TUB MANUFACTURE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE ON PERSONS SEEN LEAVING 
INTRRTRO AND THRSB PBRSONS WERE IJVTBR ARRESTED FOR THE 
MANUFACTURE OR ATTEMPTED MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHBTAMINR. 
YOUR AFFIANT AND FELLOW OFFICERS HAVE SERVED SEARCH WARRANTS IN 
OTHER INVESTIGATIONS REGARDING THE MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHErAMINR 
AND FOUND RECEIPTS AND CHEMICALS AT THESE LOCATIONS WITH THE NAME 
1NTERTEC ON THEM. 
DETECTIVE RICHMOND TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT ON TWO SEPARATE 
OCCASIONS DURING THE MONTH OF DBCEMBER 1990 A CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT, SFCI-4, EMPLOYED BY THE FOUR -CORNERS NARCOTICS TASK 
FORCE PURCHASED METHAMPHETAMINE IN QUARTER-GRAM AMOUNTS FROM TWO 
SEPARATE SUSPRCTS. ON BOTH OCCASIONS SFCI-4 BTATBD TO DETECTIVE 
RICHMOND THAT BOTH SUSPECTS TOLD SFCI-4 THAT THE METHAMPHBTAMtNB 
CAME FROM LINDA HIXON AT HER RESIDENCE. 
ON JANUARY 7, 1991 DETECTIVE RON RICHMOND INTERVIEWED AN ARRESTED 
PERSON AT THE SAN JUAN COUNTY JAIL CONCERNING NARCOTIC 
TRAFFICKING IN THE GRAND AND SAN JUAN COUNTY AREA. DETECTIVE 
RICHMOND TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT THE ARRESTED PERSON STATED THAT 
IIR/SHR HAS HAD A PERSONAL REIATIONSHIP WITH LINDA HIXON MOST OF 
HIS/HER ADULT LIFE AND THAT LINDA HIXON HAS PROVIDED 
MRU I AMPHETAMINE TO THE ARRESTED PERSON IN THE PAST. 
THE ARRESTED PERSON PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION WITHOUT ANY PROMISE 
OR CONSIDERATION OF PENDING CHARGBS FROM tAW ENFORCEMENT. THE 
ARRESTED PERSON HAS PREVIOUS ARRESTS FOR NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS AND 
POSSESSES RNOWLEDGB OF THE DRUG CULTURE. THE ARRESTED PERSON 
WISHES TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS BRCAUSB OF FEAR FOR RETALIATION FROM 
THE HIXON S AND/OR THEIR ASSOCIATES. 
THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RELIABLE BECAUSE THE 
ARRES1R0 PERSON GAVE HIE INFORMATION WITHOUT ANY EXPECTATION OP 
RFI.IFF FR"M I-AW ENFORCEMENT AND BECAUSE OF OTHER INFORMATION 
PROVIDED TO DETECTIVE RICHMOND BY THE ARRESTED PERSON WHICH WAS 
VERIFIED BY SFCI-4 
DETECTIVE RICHMOND TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT THE ARRESTED PERSON 
STATED THAT LINDA HIXON SOLD MRTHAMPHETAMINB BY THE "qUARTRR GRAM 
AMD THAT THE MEIIIAMPHETAMINB WAS STORED OUTSIDE THE HIXON 
RESIDENCE WRING THE NIMH* AND TARBN INSIDE DURING THE DAY. 
DETECTIVE RICHMOND STATED TO TOUR AFFIANT THAT SFCI-4 HAH 
INFORMED HIM THAT LINDA HIXON PREFERRED TO SELL MBTHAMPHBTAMINE 
BY THE "QUARrER GRAM" BECAUSE SHE MADE THB MOST MONEY THAT MAY. 
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ALSO STATED TO DETECTIVE RICHMOND AND 
TO YOOR AFFIANT THAT THE MRTHAMrHRTAMlNB WAS PIACED INSIDE THR 
RESIDENCE DURING THE DAY AND REMOVED AT NIGHT. BOTH THE ARRRSIE1) 
PPRSOH AMD THE SFCI 4 STATED THAT THE HBTHAMPHErAMINE WAS 
RFMOVEDFROM THR RESIDENCE AT 7:00 PM AND PLACED OUTSIDE. 
PAOB FIVE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR GKARCII WARRANT 
THB INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DKTBCTIVB RICHMOND BY SFOl-4 SHOULD 
FIB CONSIDERED RELIABLE BECAUSE SFCI HAS BEEN EMPLOYni) AB A 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 7 
YEARS WITH 2 YEARS BRING WITH EITHER THE CARBON/EMERY NARCOTICS 
TASK. FORCE OR THE FOUR CORNERS NARCOTICS TASK FORCE. WIRING THIS 
TIME l!R HAS PROVIDED INFORMATION RESULTING IN TUB ARRESTS AND 
SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF MORE THAN 50 NARCOTICS CASES OR SEARCH 
WARRANTS. 
DETECTIVE RICHMOND TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT BINCE APPROXIMATELY THE 
MIDDLE OF THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1901 DETECTIVE RICHMOND HAS 
MAINTAINED INTERMITTENT 6URVBILLANCB OF THE HIXON RESIDENCE AT 
153 EAST .'300 NORTH IN HOAB, UTAH. DETECTIVE RICHMOND HAS TOLD 
YOUR AFFIANT THAT ON MORE THEN ONE OCCASION HE HAS OBSERVED 
VEHICLES DRIVE TO THE HIXON S RESIDENCE AMD DETECTIVE RICHMOND 
HAS OHSRRVRD PEOPLE GO INSIDE TUB RESIDENCE OR WAIT AT THE IXX)R 
FOR VERY SHORT PERIODS OF TIME AND THEN LEAVE IN THEIR 
VEHICLES. DBTBCT1VB RICHMOND HAS TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT HE 
RECOGNIZED SEVERAL PERSONS VISITING TUB HIXON S AS PERSONS 
IDENTIFIED TO HIM BY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AS BEING INVOLVED IN THE DRUG 
CULTURE. DETRCTIVB RICHMOND HAS INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED PERSONS 
WITH PRIOR ARREST RECORDS FOR DRUG POSSESSION AND/OR DISTRIBUTION 
AS VISITING THE HIXON'B. 
YOUR AFFIAjITjy^p^J^EIBCTIVB-RiaiMOND HAVE BURVB1LLBD THB NAMED 
PREMISE CWITHIB THE. PART T!|REB DAYS) AND FOUND THB BAMB TRAFFIC 
PATTERN AS ON OTHER SURVEILLANCE. 
YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE THAT PEOPLE IN 
THB DRUG TRAFFICKING BUSINESS TEND TO MEET BRIEFLY WITH THBtR 
CUSTOMERS AT THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH 
PREVIOUS UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS THAT PBOPLB WHO PURCHASE DRUGS 
TEND TO CONTINUE BUYING NARCOTICS EVEN THOUGH THEY POSSESS ARRBBT 
RECORDS FOR DRUG OFFENSES. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS SEEN SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS AND SURVEILLANCE LOGS 
CONCERNING THR VOIAJMR OF PEOPLE VISITINQ THB HtXON RESIDENCE FOR 
A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND THEN LEAVING AND THEN AGAIN WITH SOME 
RETURNING DURING OTHER SURVEILLANCE PERIODS. DETECTIVE RICHMOND 
TOLD YOUR AFFIANT THAT DURING THESE OCCURRENCES IJVRRY HIXON 
REMAINS OUTRIDE THB RESIDENCE WHILE THR VISITORS (JO INSIDE OR 
WAIT AT THB BAST S1DB DOOR. 
PASF.D ON YOUR AFFIANTS TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE PERSONS THAT ARE 
INVOLVED IN TUB DRUG CULTURE DEMONSTRATE ACTIONS CONSISTENt Willi 
WHAT DETECTIVE RICHMOND DESCRIBED AND ALONG WITH HIS SURVEILLANCE 
LOGS AND PHOTOS. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BASED ON YOUR AFFIANTS TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE TUB FACTB OUTLINRD 
IN 11IIS AFFIDAVIT ARE INDICATIVE OF AN ON(JOlN(J NARCOTICS 
TRANSACTION, DISTRIBUTION AND SALES OPERATION LOCATED AT THE 
IIIXON RESIDENCE AT 153 BAST 300 NORTH IN MOAB,UTAH. 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREHIBB8 BHOULD BB SEARCHED 
FOR QUANTITIES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. THE BALES OPERATION 
APPEARS TO HE ONGOING AND QUANTITIES WILL BB ON THE PREMISES FOR 
SALE. 
YOUR AFFIANT ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMISES BHOULD HE 
SEARCHED FOR SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIALS. YOUR AFFIANT KNOW!? 
FROM TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE THAT THESE ITEMS ARE INHERENT TO A 
DRUG SALES OPERATION AND ARE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THE ONGOING 
OPBRATION OF SALES. 
YOUR AFFIANT ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMISES BHOULD BB 
SEARCHED FOR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS FROM TRAINING 
AND EXPERIENCE THAT THESE ITEMS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS FOUND ON THE 
PREMISES WHERE NARCOTICS ARE SOLD AN/OR USED AND YOUR AFFIANT HAS 
FOUND THESE ITEMS ON PREVIOUS NARCOTICS SEARCH WARRANTS. 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMISES SHOULD HE SEARCHED 
FOR RECORDS OF NARCOTICS SALES SUCH AS PAY/OWB SHEETS, 
LEDGERS,NOTEBOOKS, AND OTHER PAPERS IDENTIFIED AS RECORDS OF 
NARCOTICS SALES. YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS FROM TRAINING AND BXPBRIBNCB 
THAT PERSONS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS SALES OFTEN KEEP SUCH RECORDS 
TO SHOW AMOUNTS PURCHASED, DATBS, WHO PURCHASED AND BBPKCIALLY 
DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMIBBB SHOULD BB SEARCHED 
FOR RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO TELEPHONE 
BILLS,UTILITY BILLS,CREDIT CARD STATEMENTS,INVOICES AND RBCBlPrS 
IN ORDER THAT YOUR AFFIANT MAY FULLY IDENTIFY THE (XXXJPANTS OF 
THE NAMED PREMISES. 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMISES SHOULD BB SEARCHED 
FOR U.S. CURRENCY. YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH TRAINING AND 
EXPERIENCE THAT PERSONS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS BALES KEEP MONEY ON 
HAND TO MARE CHANGE AND PROCEEDS OF NARCOTIC^ BOLD. 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT TUB NAMED PREMIBBB BHOULD HE SEARCHED 
FOR PRECURSOR CHEMICALS GENERALLY USED IM THE MANUFACTURB OF 
METHAMPHBTAMINB TO INCLUDE: HYDRIODIC ACID, BPHBDRINB, AND RED 
PHOSPHORUS AMD ANY OTHER CHEMICAL USED IM THE MANUFACTURB OF A 
aniTROLI.ED SUBSTANCB.YOUR AFFIANT HAS VERIFIED THAT LARRY IHXOH 
HAS IN THE PAST BOUGHT SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL OHEMIOAI.S TO 
MANUFACTURE METHAMPHBTAMINB. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 
YOUR AFFIANT BELIEVES THAT THE NAMED PREMISES SHOULD BR SEARCHED 
FOR GLASSWARE, APPARATUS, AND ANY RECIPES OR LITKRATtlRF 
DESCRIBING THE MANUFACTURE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.YOUR AFFIANT 
HAS HEFH IN OTHER CLANDESTINE LABS WHERE AI0NG WITH THE CHBM10AI.S 
THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN COMMONLY FOUND. 
YOUR AFFIANT PRAYS FOR NO-KNOCK SERVICE OF THIS SEARCH WARRANT. 
YOUR AFFIANT FEARS THAT IF NOTICE WERE REQUIRED OF THE OFFICERS 
RXRCUriNG THIS SEARCH WARRANT, THE SUSPECT'S WOULD IDAVB AMPLE 
WARNING OR TIME TO DESTROY, ALTER OR SECRETE THE NARCOTICS SOUGHT 
AFTER IN THIS SEARCH WARRANT INASMUCH AS NARCOTICS ARE USUALLY 
SOLD IN SUFFICIENTLY SMALL ENOUGH QUANTITIES IX) BE EASILY 
DESTROYED OR HIDDEN. FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT KNOWS THROUGH PREVIOUS 
EXPERIENCE THAT PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE NARCOTICS BUSINESS OFTEN 
USE FIREARMS TO PROTBCT THEIR NARCOTICS AND PROCEEDS FROM OTHER 
DRUG DEALERS AND/OR HIE POLICE. 
YOUR AFFIANT IIAS HAD THIS WARRANT/ AFFIDAVIT REVIEWED BY GRAND 
COUNTY ATTORNEY LYLE ANDERSON AND TIIB WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT HAS BEEN 
APPROVED FOR NO-KNOCK SERVICE AND PRESENTATION TO THE COURTS. 
YOUR AFFIANT (X)NSIDBRS HIE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DETECTIVE 
RICHMOND, SFCI 4,AN ARRESTED PERSON, AND THROUGH 6URVB1LIANGS 
THAT AN ONGOING NARCOTIC SAIJSS ENTERPRISE IS OCCURRING. YlXJR 
AFFIANT HAS PERSONALLY OBSERVED SOME OF THE INTERMITTENT TRAFFIC 
AT THE NAMED PREMISE AND PRAYS FOR THE ISSUING OF A SEARt.il 
WARRANT JF THE JUDGE SHOULD FIND SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
ADDENDUM C 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, #3695 
Grand County Attorney 
125 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: 801-259-7621 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY R. HIXON and 
LINDA LEE HIXON, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell presiding, on the Motion to Suppress dated September 17, 
1991, filed by defendants Larry R. Hixon ("Larry") and Linda Lee 
Hixon ("Linda") (collectively the "Hixons"). The Hixons 
submitted their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on 
January 21, 1992• The State submitted its Objection to Motion to 
Suppress and Statement of Answering Points and Authorities on 
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January 29, 1992. The Hixons submitted no reply statement of 
points and authorities. The Court issued its Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress on March 3, 1992, and directed counsel for the State to 
prepare an order in accordance with its ruling. From the 
memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1; On April 14, 1991, Officer Joe Christman of the 
Utah Division of Investigations filed with Magistrate Kristine M. 
Rogers, Grand County Justice Court Judge, an Affidavit for Search 
Warrant (the "Affidavit") requesting a warrant to search the 
residence of the Hixons. 
2. The Affidavit described the premises to be 
searched, as well as the evidence to be seized, with 
particularity. 
3. The magistrate found probable cause and issued a 
Search Warrant authorizing the search requested. 
4. The Hixons have not alleged that the Affidavit 
contained any deliberate falsehoods nor that the statements 
2 
contained therein manifest a reckless disregard for the truth. 
The Hixons did not request an evidentiary hearing. 
5., The Affidavit contained three independent pieces 
of evidence showing that methamphetamine was being sold at the 
residence of the Hixons. They were: 
A. Larry had purchased one gallon of hydriodic 
acid, an essential chemical for the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, on March 7, 1990, using a false business name, 
address and telephone number. 
B. Two confidential informants, each independent 
of the other, provided the police with information tending to 
show that the Hixons were selling methamphetamine from their 
residence in December, 1990, and January, 1991. One of the 
informants was an individual who had a long history of providing 
reliable narcotics information to the police. 
C. Surveillance of the residence of the Hixons 
from February 1, 1991 to April 4, 1991, showed a traffic pattern 
consistent with the sale of drugs. 
6. The Hixons did not challenge the no-knock 
provision of the search warrant. 
3 
7. The Court has reviewed the Affidavit in its 
entirety, and in a common sense fashion, considering the totality 
of the circumstances described therein. 
8. The Court believes that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of crime would be found 
at the residence of the Hixons. There was, accordingly, 
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standard for review of the sufficiency of 
search warrant affidavits under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, does not differ from that set forth in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
2. The right of the Hixons to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, was not violated by the issuance of the 
search warrant or the actions of the police pursuant thereto. 
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3. Because the Court finds no violation of the 
constitutional rights of the Hixonsf the Court does not address 
whether there is a good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
or whether the conduct of the officers meets the standard of that 
good faith exception or the good faith exception under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution enunciated in U.S. v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
4# The Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
DATED this jTV-day of March, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM D 
ORDER SETTING BOND 
ON APPEAL 
JAM 04 '93 03:43PM YENGICH ET. ftL P . ^ 
RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
FILED JAN 0 4 1993 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT- OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
LINDA LEE HIXON, 
Defendant. 
) 
ORDER SETTING BOND 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 91-35 
Based upon the motion of defendant and the Response to 
Application for Certificate of Probable Cause filed by Lyle R. 
Anderson, Grand County Attorney, on or about the 31st day of 
December, 1992, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bond in this matter is set in 
the amount of $5,000.00. s7<£ 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this 
1 
day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Case No: 911700035 FS 
Certificate of Mailing 
/ & I 
I certify that on the v day of ' )u jnui '»• A; f ^ 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Atty for Defendant 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH 
#400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
WILLIAM L. BENGE 
Atty for Plaintiff 
P. O. BOX 699 
MOAB UT 84532 
District Court Clerk 
By: t-U /.-JJL-Lt / 
Deputy Clerk 
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